diff --git a/random/jitterentropy-base.c b/random/jitterentropy-base.c
index dc907b2..32fdea4 100644
--- a/random/jitterentropy-base.c
+++ b/random/jitterentropy-base.c
@@ -1,789 +1,791 @@
/*
* Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter.
*
* Copyright Stephan Mueller , 2014 - 2017
*
* Design
* ======
*
* See documentation in doc/ folder.
*
* Interface
* =========
*
* See documentation in doc/ folder.
*
* License
* =======
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
* including the disclaimer of warranties.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior
* written permission.
*
* ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
* the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2 are
* required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
* necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
* the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
* WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
* OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
* BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
* USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
* DAMAGE.
*/
#undef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
#pragma GCC optimize ("O0")
#include "jitterentropy.h"
#ifndef CONFIG_CRYPTO_CPU_JITTERENTROPY_STAT
/* only check optimization in a compilation for real work */
#ifdef __OPTIMIZE__
#error "The CPU Jitter random number generator must not be compiled with optimizations. See documentation. Use the compiler switch -O0 for compiling jitterentropy-base.c."
#endif
#endif
#define MAJVERSION 2 /* API / ABI incompatible changes, functional changes that
* require consumer to be updated (as long as this number
* is zero, the API is not considered stable and can
* change without a bump of the major version) */
#define MINVERSION 1 /* API compatible, ABI may change, functional
* enhancements only, consumer can be left unchanged if
* enhancements are not considered */
#define PATCHLEVEL 0 /* API / ABI compatible, no functional changes, no
* enhancements, bug fixes only */
/**
* jent_version() - Return machine-usable version number of jent library
*
* The function returns a version number that is monotonic increasing
* for newer versions. The version numbers are multiples of 100. For example,
* version 1.2.3 is converted to 1020300 -- the last two digits are reserved
* for future use.
*
* The result of this function can be used in comparing the version number
* in a calling program if version-specific calls need to be make.
*
* Return: Version number of kcapi library
*/
JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
unsigned int jent_version(void)
{
unsigned int version = 0;
version = MAJVERSION * 1000000;
version += MINVERSION * 10000;
version += PATCHLEVEL * 100;
return version;
}
/**
* Update of the loop count used for the next round of
* an entropy collection.
*
* Input:
* @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL
* @bits is the number of low bits of the timer to consider
* @min is the number of bits we shift the timer value to the right at
* the end to make sure we have a guaranteed minimum value
*
* @return Newly calculated loop counter
*/
static uint64_t jent_loop_shuffle(struct rand_data *ec,
unsigned int bits, unsigned int min)
{
uint64_t time = 0;
uint64_t shuffle = 0;
unsigned int i = 0;
unsigned int mask = (1<data;
/*
* We fold the time value as much as possible to ensure that as many
* bits of the time stamp are included as possible.
*/
for (i = 0; (DATA_SIZE_BITS / bits) > i; i++) {
shuffle ^= time & mask;
time = time >> bits;
}
/*
* We add a lower boundary value to ensure we have a minimum
* RNG loop count.
*/
return (shuffle + (1<data
*
* @return Number of loops the folding operation is performed
*/
static uint64_t jent_lfsr_time(struct rand_data *ec, uint64_t time,
uint64_t loop_cnt)
{
unsigned int i;
uint64_t j = 0;
uint64_t new = 0;
#define MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 4
#define MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 0
uint64_t fold_loop_cnt =
jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT, MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT);
/*
* testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not
* needed during runtime
*/
if (loop_cnt)
fold_loop_cnt = loop_cnt;
for (j = 0; j < fold_loop_cnt; j++) {
new = ec->data;
for (i = 1; (DATA_SIZE_BITS) >= i; i++) {
uint64_t tmp = time << (DATA_SIZE_BITS - i);
tmp = tmp >> (DATA_SIZE_BITS - 1);
/*
* Fibonacci LSFR with polynomial of
* x^64 + x^61 + x^56 + x^31 + x^28 + x^23 + 1 which is
* primitive according to
* http://poincare.matf.bg.ac.rs/~ezivkovm/publications/primpol1.pdf
* (the shift values are the polynomial values minus one
* due to counting bits from 0 to 63). As the current
* position is always the LSB, the polynomial only needs
* to shift data in from the left without wrap.
*/
new ^= tmp;
new ^= ((new >> 63) & 1);
new ^= ((new >> 60) & 1);
new ^= ((new >> 55) & 1);
new ^= ((new >> 30) & 1);
new ^= ((new >> 27) & 1);
new ^= ((new >> 22) & 1);
new = rol64(new, 1);
}
}
ec->data = new;
return fold_loop_cnt;
}
/**
* Memory Access noise source -- this is a noise source based on variations in
* memory access times
*
* This function performs memory accesses which will add to the timing
* variations due to an unknown amount of CPU wait states that need to be
* added when accessing memory. The memory size should be larger than the L1
* caches as outlined in the documentation and the associated testing.
*
* The L1 cache has a very high bandwidth, albeit its access rate is usually
* slower than accessing CPU registers. Therefore, L1 accesses only add minimal
* variations as the CPU has hardly to wait. Starting with L2, significant
* variations are added because L2 typically does not belong to the CPU any more
* and therefore a wider range of CPU wait states is necessary for accesses.
* L3 and real memory accesses have even a wider range of wait states. However,
* to reliably access either L3 or memory, the ec->mem memory must be quite
* large which is usually not desirable.
*
* Input:
* @ec Reference to the entropy collector with the memory access data -- if
* the reference to the memory block to be accessed is NULL, this noise
* source is disabled
* @loop_cnt if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as number of
* loops to perform the folding
*
* @return Number of memory access operations
*/
static unsigned int jent_memaccess(struct rand_data *ec, uint64_t loop_cnt)
{
unsigned int wrap = 0;
uint64_t i = 0;
#define MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT 7
#define MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT 0
uint64_t acc_loop_cnt =
jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT, MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT);
if (NULL == ec || NULL == ec->mem)
return 0;
wrap = ec->memblocksize * ec->memblocks;
/*
* testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not
* needed during runtime
*/
if (loop_cnt)
acc_loop_cnt = loop_cnt;
for (i = 0; i < (ec->memaccessloops + acc_loop_cnt); i++) {
unsigned char *tmpval = ec->mem + ec->memlocation;
/*
* memory access: just add 1 to one byte,
* wrap at 255 -- memory access implies read
* from and write to memory location
*/
*tmpval = (*tmpval + 1) & 0xff;
/*
* Addition of memblocksize - 1 to pointer
* with wrap around logic to ensure that every
* memory location is hit evenly
*/
ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation + ec->memblocksize - 1;
ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation % wrap;
}
return i;
}
/***************************************************************************
* Start of entropy processing logic
***************************************************************************/
/**
* Stuck test by checking the:
* 1st derivation of the jitter measurement (time delta)
* 2nd derivation of the jitter measurement (delta of time deltas)
* 3rd derivation of the jitter measurement (delta of delta of time deltas)
*
* All values must always be non-zero.
*
* Input:
* @ec Reference to entropy collector
* @current_delta Jitter time delta
*
* @return
* 0 jitter measurement not stuck (good bit)
* 1 jitter measurement stuck (reject bit)
*/
static int jent_stuck(struct rand_data *ec, uint64_t current_delta)
{
int64_t delta2 = ec->last_delta - current_delta;
int64_t delta3 = delta2 - ec->last_delta2;
ec->last_delta = current_delta;
ec->last_delta2 = delta2;
if (!current_delta || !delta2 || !delta3)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/**
* This is the heart of the entropy generation: calculate time deltas and
* use the CPU jitter in the time deltas. The jitter is injected into the
* entropy pool.
*
* WARNING: ensure that ->prev_time is primed before using the output
* of this function! This can be done by calling this function
* and not using its result.
*
* Input:
* @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector
*
* @return: result of stuck test
*/
static int jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec)
{
uint64_t time = 0;
uint64_t current_delta = 0;
int stuck;
/* Invoke one noise source before time measurement to add variations */
jent_memaccess(ec, 0);
/*
* Get time stamp and calculate time delta to previous
* invocation to measure the timing variations
*/
jent_get_nstime(&time);
current_delta = time - ec->prev_time;
ec->prev_time = time;
/* Now call the next noise sources which also injects the data */
jent_lfsr_time(ec, current_delta, 0);
/* Check whether we have a stuck measurement. */
stuck = jent_stuck(ec, current_delta);
/*
* Rotate the data buffer by a prime number (any odd number would
* do) to ensure that every bit position of the input time stamp
* has an even chance of being merged with a bit position in the
* entropy pool. We do not use one here as the adjacent bits in
* successive time deltas may have some form of dependency. The
* chosen value of 7 implies that the low 7 bits of the next
* time delta value is concatenated with the current time delta.
*/
if (!stuck)
ec->data = rol64(ec->data, 7);
return stuck;
}
/**
* Shuffle the pool a bit by mixing some value with a bijective function (XOR)
* into the pool.
*
* The function generates a mixer value that depends on the bits set and the
* location of the set bits in the random number generated by the entropy
* source. Therefore, based on the generated random number, this mixer value
* can have 2**64 different values. That mixer value is initialized with the
* first two SHA-1 constants. After obtaining the mixer value, it is XORed into
* the random number.
*
* The mixer value is not assumed to contain any entropy. But due to the XOR
* operation, it can also not destroy any entropy present in the entropy pool.
*
* Input:
* @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector
*/
static void jent_stir_pool(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
{
/*
* to shut up GCC on 32 bit, we have to initialize the 64 variable
* with two 32 bit variables
*/
union c {
uint64_t uint64;
uint32_t uint32[2];
};
/*
* This constant is derived from the first two 32 bit initialization
* vectors of SHA-1 as defined in FIPS 180-4 section 5.3.1
*/
union c constant;
/*
* The start value of the mixer variable is derived from the third
* and fourth 32 bit initialization vector of SHA-1 as defined in
* FIPS 180-4 section 5.3.1
*/
union c mixer;
unsigned int i = 0;
/* Ensure that the function implements a constant time operation. */
union c throw_away;
/*
* Store the SHA-1 constants in reverse order to make up the 64 bit
* value -- this applies to a little endian system, on a big endian
* system, it reverses as expected. But this really does not matter
* as we do not rely on the specific numbers. We just pick the SHA-1
* constants as they have a good mix of bit set and unset.
*/
constant.uint32[1] = 0x67452301;
constant.uint32[0] = 0xefcdab89;
mixer.uint32[1] = 0x98badcfe;
mixer.uint32[0] = 0x10325476;
for (i = 0; i < DATA_SIZE_BITS; i++) {
/*
* get the i-th bit of the input random number and only XOR
* the constant into the mixer value when that bit is set
*/
if ((entropy_collector->data >> i) & 1)
mixer.uint64 ^= constant.uint64;
else
throw_away.uint64 ^= constant.uint64;
mixer.uint64 = rol64(mixer.uint64, 1);
}
entropy_collector->data ^= mixer.uint64;
}
/**
* Generator of one 64 bit random number
* Function fills rand_data->data
*
* Input:
* @ec Reference to entropy collector
*/
static void jent_gen_entropy(struct rand_data *ec)
{
unsigned int k = 0;
/* priming of the ->prev_time value */
jent_measure_jitter(ec);
while (1) {
/* If a stuck measurement is received, repeat measurement */
if (jent_measure_jitter(ec))
continue;
/*
* We multiply the loop value with ->osr to obtain the
* oversampling rate requested by the caller
*/
if (++k >= (DATA_SIZE_BITS * ec->osr))
break;
}
if (ec->stir)
jent_stir_pool(ec);
}
/**
* The continuous test required by FIPS 140-2 -- the function automatically
* primes the test if needed.
*
* Return:
* 0 if FIPS test passed
* < 0 if FIPS test failed
*/
static int jent_fips_test(struct rand_data *ec)
{
if (ec->fips_enabled == -1)
return 0;
if (ec->fips_enabled == 0) {
if (!jent_fips_enabled()) {
ec->fips_enabled = -1;
return 0;
} else
ec->fips_enabled = 1;
}
/* prime the FIPS test */
if (!ec->old_data) {
ec->old_data = ec->data;
jent_gen_entropy(ec);
}
if (ec->data == ec->old_data)
return -1;
ec->old_data = ec->data;
return 0;
}
/**
* Entry function: Obtain entropy for the caller.
*
* This function invokes the entropy gathering logic as often to generate
* as many bytes as requested by the caller. The entropy gathering logic
* creates 64 bit per invocation.
*
* This function truncates the last 64 bit entropy value output to the exact
* size specified by the caller.
*
* Input:
* @ec Reference to entropy collector
* @data pointer to buffer for storing random data -- buffer must already
* exist
* @len size of the buffer, specifying also the requested number of random
* in bytes
*
* @return number of bytes returned when request is fulfilled or an error
*
* The following error codes can occur:
* -1 entropy_collector is NULL
* -2 FIPS test failed
*/
JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
ssize_t jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, char *data, size_t len)
{
char *p = data;
size_t orig_len = len;
if (NULL == ec)
return -1;
while (0 < len) {
size_t tocopy;
jent_gen_entropy(ec);
if (jent_fips_test(ec))
return -2;
if ((DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8) < len)
tocopy = (DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8);
else
tocopy = len;
memcpy(p, &ec->data, tocopy);
len -= tocopy;
p += tocopy;
}
/*
* To be on the safe side, we generate one more round of entropy
* which we do not give out to the caller. That round shall ensure
* that in case the calling application crashes, memory dumps, pages
* out, or due to the CPU Jitter RNG lingering in memory for long
* time without being moved and an attacker cracks the application,
* all he reads in the entropy pool is a value that is NEVER EVER
* being used for anything. Thus, he does NOT see the previous value
* that was returned to the caller for cryptographic purposes.
*/
/*
* If we use secured memory, do not use that precaution as the secure
* memory protects the entropy pool. Moreover, note that using this
* call reduces the speed of the RNG by up to half
*/
#ifndef CONFIG_CRYPTO_CPU_JITTERENTROPY_SECURE_MEMORY
jent_gen_entropy(ec);
#endif
return orig_len;
}
/***************************************************************************
* Initialization logic
***************************************************************************/
JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct rand_data *entropy_collector;
entropy_collector = jent_zalloc(sizeof(struct rand_data));
if (NULL == entropy_collector)
return NULL;
if (!(flags & JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS)) {
/* Allocate memory for adding variations based on memory
* access
*/
entropy_collector->mem =
(unsigned char *)jent_zalloc(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE);
if (NULL == entropy_collector->mem) {
jent_zfree(entropy_collector, sizeof(struct rand_data));
return NULL;
}
entropy_collector->memblocksize = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE;
entropy_collector->memblocks = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS;
entropy_collector->memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS;
}
/* verify and set the oversampling rate */
if (0 == osr)
osr = 1; /* minimum sampling rate is 1 */
entropy_collector->osr = osr;
entropy_collector->stir = 1;
if (flags & JENT_DISABLE_STIR)
entropy_collector->stir = 0;
if (flags & JENT_DISABLE_UNBIAS)
entropy_collector->disable_unbias = 1;
/* fill the data pad with non-zero values */
jent_gen_entropy(entropy_collector);
return entropy_collector;
}
JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
{
if (NULL != entropy_collector) {
if (NULL != entropy_collector->mem) {
jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem, JENT_MEMORY_SIZE);
entropy_collector->mem = NULL;
}
jent_zfree(entropy_collector, sizeof(struct rand_data));
}
}
JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
int jent_entropy_init(void)
{
int i;
uint64_t delta_sum = 0;
uint64_t old_delta = 0;
int time_backwards = 0;
int count_mod = 0;
int count_stuck = 0;
struct rand_data ec;
+ memset(&ec, 0, sizeof(ec));
+
/* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is
* that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These
* loop counts may show some slight skew and we produce
* false positives.
*
* Moreover, only old systems show potentially problematic
* jitter entropy that could potentially be caught here. But
* the RNG is intended for hardware that is available or widely
* used, but not old systems that are long out of favor. Thus,
* no statistical tests.
*/
/*
* We could add a check for system capabilities such as clock_getres or
* check for CONFIG_X86_TSC, but it does not make much sense as the
* following sanity checks verify that we have a high-resolution
* timer.
*/
/*
* TESTLOOPCOUNT needs some loops to identify edge systems. 100 is
* definitely too little.
*/
#define TESTLOOPCOUNT 300
#define CLEARCACHE 100
for (i = 0; (TESTLOOPCOUNT + CLEARCACHE) > i; i++) {
uint64_t time = 0;
uint64_t time2 = 0;
uint64_t delta = 0;
unsigned int lowdelta = 0;
int stuck;
/* Invoke core entropy collection logic */
jent_get_nstime(&time);
ec.prev_time = time;
jent_lfsr_time(&ec, time, 0);
jent_get_nstime(&time2);
/* test whether timer works */
if (!time || !time2)
return ENOTIME;
delta = time2 - time;
/*
* test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide
* delta even when called shortly after each other -- this
* implies that we also have a high resolution timer
*/
if (!delta)
return ECOARSETIME;
stuck = jent_stuck(&ec, delta);
/*
* up to here we did not modify any variable that will be
* evaluated later, but we already performed some work. Thus we
* already have had an impact on the caches, branch prediction,
* etc. with the goal to clear it to get the worst case
* measurements.
*/
if (CLEARCACHE > i)
continue;
if (stuck)
count_stuck++;
/* test whether we have an increasing timer */
if (!(time2 > time))
time_backwards++;
/* use 32 bit value to ensure compilation on 32 bit arches */
lowdelta = time2 - time;
if (!(lowdelta % 100))
count_mod++;
/*
* ensure that we have a varying delta timer which is necessary
* for the calculation of entropy -- perform this check
* only after the first loop is executed as we need to prime
* the old_data value
*/
if (delta > old_delta)
delta_sum += (delta - old_delta);
else
delta_sum += (old_delta - delta);
old_delta = delta;
}
/*
* we allow up to three times the time running backwards.
* CLOCK_REALTIME is affected by adjtime and NTP operations. Thus,
* if such an operation just happens to interfere with our test, it
* should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being
* performed during our test run.
*/
if (3 < time_backwards)
return ENOMONOTONIC;
/*
* Variations of deltas of time must on average be larger
* than 1 to ensure the entropy estimation
* implied with 1 is preserved
*/
if ((delta_sum) <= 1)
return EMINVARVAR;
/*
* Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 10 for at least
* 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter increments in
* multiples of 100, but not always
*/
if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_mod)
return ECOARSETIME;
/*
* If we have more than 90% stuck results, then this Jitter RNG is
* likely to not work well.
*/
if (JENT_STUCK_INIT_THRES(TESTLOOPCOUNT) < count_stuck)
return ESTUCK;
return 0;
}
/***************************************************************************
* Statistical test logic not compiled for regular operation
***************************************************************************/
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_CPU_JITTERENTROPY_STAT
/*
* Statistical test: return the time duration for the folding operation. If min
* is set, perform the given number of LFSR ops. Otherwise, allow the
* loop count shuffling to define the number of LFSR ops.
*/
JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
uint64_t jent_lfsr_var_stat(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int min)
{
uint64_t time = 0;
uint64_t time2 = 0;
jent_get_nstime(&time);
jent_memaccess(ec, min);
jent_lfsr_time(ec, time, min);
jent_get_nstime(&time2);
return ((time2 - time));
}
#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_CPU_JITTERENTROPY_STAT */